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Social identity and attitudes
In short, man’s socialization is revealed mainly in his attitudes formed 
in relation to the values or norms of his reference group or groups.
(Sherif, 1936, p. 203)
The investigation of attitudes brings us to the center of the person’s 
social relations and to the heart of the dynamics of social processes. 
(Asch, 1952, p. 577)
As these quotes attest, early influential social psychologists viewed attitudes and the 
social contexts in which attitudes are formed, changed, and expressed as inextricably linked. 
Despite this, surprisingly little attention has been directed toward the interplay of attitudes 
with social context. The social psychological study of attitudes almost universally adopts a 
conceptualization of attitudes as intra-individual cognitive structures –as individual cognitive 
representations that are acquired and possessed by individuals and which, to a great extent, are 
a part of human individuality (see Bohner & Wanke, 2002; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fazio & 
Olson, 2003; Maio & Haddock, in press). What is missing or underemphasized in all this is 
that our attitudes are rarely idiosyncratic –more often than not they are grounded in the groups 
we belong to and they serve to define and proclaim who we are in terms of our relationships to 
others who are members of the same or different groups. 
Attitudes are powerful bases for making group stereotypical or normative inferences 
about other attitudes and about behaviors and customs – they let us construct a norm-based 
persona that reduces uncertainty and regulates social interaction. Attitudes are grounded in 
social consensus defined by group membership. Many, if not most, of our attitudes reflect and 
even define groups with which we identify. We are autobiographically idiosyncratic, but our 
attitudes are actually attached to group memberships that we internalize to define ourselves. 
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In this chapter we promote a group-centric orientation to attitudes and describe what 
the social identity approach contributes to our understanding of attitudes and attitudinal 
phenomena. The main point we make is that attitudes are grounded in group memberships; 
thus, attitude research must consider more completely the way in which attitudes are socially 
formed, configured, and enacted. This is not to say that attitudes are not cognitively 
represented by individual people - they are. Rather, we emphasize the way that attitudes are 
normative and embedded in wider representational and ideological systems attached to social 
groups and categories. Attitudes map the contours of social groups and shared identities. 
Attitude phenomena are impacted significantly by social identity processes. They are socially 
structured and grounded in social consensus, group memberships, and social identities. Our 
analysis of attitudes comes from the social psychology of group processes and intergroup 
relations, rather than the social psychology of attitudes. More specifically, it comes from social 
identity theory (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, 
& Wetherell, 1987) and the metatheory that frames social identity theory (Abrams & Hogg, 
2004). 
We present a social identity perspective on attitudes (also see Hogg & Smith, in press) 
that draws on, integrates, and extends basic principles of classic and contemporary social 
identity theory. After a brief review of the current state of research on attitudes and the social 
context, we introduce social identity theory and focus on what it has to say about atitudes – 
how attitudes are embedded in descriptive and prescriptive group prototypes, how attitudes 
become group normative, how social categorization of self assigns group attitudes to self via 
depersonalization, and how social identity processes underpin influence in groups and the 
development and communication of normative attitudes. We discuss research on the impact of 
social identity processes on attitude change and persuasion, focusing on persuasion, 
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dissonance, minority influence, and the third-person effect. Finally, we examine the impact of 
social identity processes on the relationship between people’s attitudes and their behavior. In 
each section, we present theory and review research conducted primarily, but not exclusively, 
in our research group over the past 10 to 15 years to illustrate our central argument that 
attitude phenomena are affected significantly by social identity processes.
Attitudes and the Social Context
The historical treatment and neglect of the social context in attitudes research may 
reflect early individualistic definitions of attitudes, and a focus on individuals rather than 
groups as the unit of analysis (e.g., F. Allport, 1919; G. Allport, 1935). Attitudes are viewed 
primarily as cognitive representations in the mind of the individual: they are “mental and 
neural states of readiness to respond” (G. Allport, 1935, p. 810). This individualistic 
orientation has persisted in the study of attitudes, with attitude researchers focusing on the 
analysis of the psychological processes and structures of individuals at the expense of attention 
to the social environment (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Prislin & Wood, 2005). However, there 
have been increasing calls in recent years for researchers to consider and integrate social 
factors into investigations of attitude dynamics (see Prislin & Christensen, 2005; Prislin & 
Wood, 2005).
Some research has acknowledged the impact of the social context on attitudes and 
attitude phenomena. However, such research has distinguished attitudes (as an informational 
determinant of action; see Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) from the social context (as a normative 
determinant of action). That is, the distinction between informational influence (e.g., message 
or argument quality) and normative influence (e.g., source) is retained. In research on attitude-
behavior relations, the social context is seen as a background factor, rather than as a 
fundamental component of attitudes. In the attitude change literature, source characteristics, 
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such as group membership, are often seen to operate through peripheral or heuristic routes, 
such that any change in attitudes attributed to these variables is less “true”, stable, and 
enduring (e.g., Chaiken, 1987; cf. Mackie & Queller, 2000). 
Thus, even when research has examined issues related to the social environment or 
social context, it has narrowed in on issues related to social influence, rather than broadening 
the scope to include the wider social environment of group memberships and social identities 
(see Prislin & Wood, 2005, for a review). Research has focused on the individual and 
interpersonal aspects of the processes by which attitudes are changed (e.g., Brinol & Petty, 
2005) and has treated the social context as a set of stimuli that act upon an individual, either in 
the form of social pressures and expectations (norms) or in the form of social motivations 
(impression management). There has been little attention given to conceptualizing the 
structure of the social environment in terms of the social norms, social identities, and socio-
structural factors that affect the formation, stability, and expression of attitudes. 
Within the attitude field, advances have been made, particularly in minority influence 
research (e.g., Crano, 2001; Prislin, Limbert, & Bauer, 2000). However, as noted by Eagly and 
Chaiken (2005), progress has not been rapid and many challenges remain in situating and 
studying attitudes within a complex and dynamic social landscape. What is needed is a re-
conceptualization of attitudes as fundamentally entwined with the social environment and 
inherently social, rather than simply reducing the social context to the inclusion of norms 
(norms as the ‘social appendage’). After all, attitudes are socially learned, socially changed, 
and socially expressed. By highlighting the impact of the social environment on individual 
attitudes, we can gain a more complete insight into the motivational complexities that drive 
attitudinal phenomena.
Social identity and attitudes
One way to facilitate this change in emphasis is to approach the conceptualization of 
attitudes from the perspective of the social psychology of groups and intergroup relations 
rather than the social psychology of the individual and interpersonal interactions. In this way 
attitudes are treated as an aspect of group life, rather than an aspect of individuality. Social 
identity theory is a powerful group perspective in social psychology that allows just such an 
analysis.
Social Identity Theory and Attitudes
Since its origins in the early 1970s, social identity theory has developed into a 
comprehensive and integrated analysis of the dynamic relationship among the self-concept, 
group memberships, group processes, and intergroup behavior (e.g., Tajfel, 1972). The concept 
of social identity is the unifying principle at the heart of the social identity approach. For Tajfel 
(1972), social identity represents “the individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social 
groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of his group membership” 
(p. 292). Social identity is not merely the knowledge that one is a member of a group and of 
the defining attributes of group membership, it also involves an emotional and motivational 
attachment to the group. Recent statements and overviews of social identity theory in its 
contemporary form can be found in Hogg (2003, 2006). Here we describe only those aspects 
that are relevant to a social identity analysis of attitudes and attitude phenomena.
Prototypes and Normative Attitudes
People cognitively represent a social group (e.g., a nation, a religion, an ethnic group) 
as a category prototype – a fuzzy set of category attributes that are related to one another in a 
meaningful way. These prototypes simultaneously capture similarities within the group and 
differences between the group and other groups or people who are not in the group (Hogg, 
2005). Category attributes can include how people look, dress, speak, behave, feel, and of, 
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course, their attitudes towards objects, events, people, and so forth. Generally, these attributes 
are relatively organized so that they “appear” to be meaningfully related and consistent with 
one another. So, attitudinal components of a group prototype will generally appear consistent – 
an appearance of consistency that may be subsumed by a wider ideology or world view 
(Larrain, 1979; Thompson, 1990), or value system (Rohan, 2000) that the perceiver believes 
the group subscribes to.
Prototypes not only describe categories but also evaluate them and prescribe 
membership-related attributes. They specify how people ought to behave as category 
members, what attitudes they ought to hold, and so forth. Prototypes chart the contours of 
social groups, and tell us not only what characterizes a group, but how that group is different 
from other groups. In this sense prototypes are norms; that is, because a particular perception, 
behavior or attitude is shared within a group, it is normative of that particular group (Sherif, 
1936; Turner, 1991). Thus, prototype-based attitudes are normative – they are shared within a 
group. Prototypes maximize entitativity or the property of a category that makes it appear a 
cohesive and clearly structured entity that is distinct from other entities (Campbell, 1958; 
Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Also, prototypes obey the metacontrast principle – their 
configuration maximizes the ratio of perceived intergroup differences to intragroup 
differences, and thus accentuates perceived similarities within groups and differences between 
groups (Tajfel, 1959). 
The prototype is the position that best defines what the group has in common 
compared to other relevant outgroups. Moreover, because social identity is defined 
comparatively and dynamically, ingroup prototypes are also defined comparatively and can 
vary with the social context. Intergroup and intragroup behavior are inextricable – what 
happens between groups afects what happens within groups, and vice versa. Attitudes and 
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attitudinal phenomena are related to self-definition in group prototypical terms to the extent 
that they are tied to group and intergroup dynamics.
Depersonalization and Referent Informational Influence 
One of the key insights of social identity theory, elaborated by self-categorization 
theory (Turner et al., 1987), is that the process of categorization of self and others, 
depersonalizes one’s perception of self and others and depersonalizes one’s own behavior. 
When we categorize people (ingroup members, outgroup members, or ourselves), we view 
them not as idiosyncratic individuals, but through the lens of the group prototype. We assign 
prototypical attributes to them, and we interpret and expect behavior, including their attitudes, 
to conform to our prototype of the group. In this way, social categorization generates 
stereotype or norm consistent expectations regarding people’s attitudes and conduct. 
Categorization of self, self-categorization, configures and changes self-conception to match 
the identity described by the category, and transforms one’s perceptions, attitudes, feelings and 
conduct to conform to the category prototype. 
Self-categorization and depersonalization account for the social cognitive process that 
causes people to internalize group attributes and behave in line with group norms – it explains 
how people internalize ingroup normative attitudes as their own attitudes. When people 
categorize themselves as members of a group and perceive that the group is important to them, 
there is an assimilation of the self to the group prototype. The norms, stereotypes, attitudes, 
and other properties that are commonly ascribed to the social group become internalized; they 
become subjectively interchangeable with personal norms, stereotypes, and attitudes, 
influencing thought and guiding action. 
The social influence process associated with identification-based conformity is referent 
informational influence (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner, 1982), in which conformity to the 
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group norm evolves through three stages. First, individuals must categorize and identify as a 
group member. Next, a context-specific prototype is constructed from available and usually 
shared social comparative information (e.g., the expressed attitudes of others). This newly 
formed prototype serves to describe and prescribe beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and behaviors 
that maximize intergroup differences and minimize intragroup differences (the metacontrast 
principle). Finally, group members internalize the prototype through assimilation of the self to 
the prototype (depersonalization), and use it as a guide to their own behavior as a group 
member. Because the prototype is internalized as part of the individual’s self-concept, it exerts 
influence over behavior even in the absence of surveillance by other group members. Once the 
norm has been identified, self-categorization produces normative behavior, including 
subscription to attitudes. It is through this process of referent informational influence that 
individuals come to learn about the group and appropriate ways of behavior.
Referent informational influence differs in a number of ways from other accounts of 
influence processes that distinguish normative influence to conform to the positive 
expectations of others from informational influence to accept information from another as 
evidence about reality (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Kelley, 1952). For example, for referent 
informational influence, people conform to a norm, not to the behavior of specific other 
individuals, and they conform because they are group members, not to validate physical reality 
or to avoid social disapproval. Because the norm is an internalized representation, people can 
conform to it in the absence of surveillance by group members. Conformity involves private 
acceptance of a norm that defines a group in which individuals include themselves and with 
which they identify (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Turner, 1991; Turner & Oakes, 1989).
Discovering the Normativeness of Attitudes
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One of the key arguments of the social identity analysis of attitudes is that certain 
attitude effects flow from the perception or knowledge that an attitude is normative of a self-
inclusive group with which one identifies. However, it is not always easy for a person to 
determine whether an attitude is normative – sometimes people miss what is normative, distort 
the norm, or get the norm entirely wrong (e.g., pluralistic ignorance –Prentice & Miller, 1996). 
We can learn the normativeness of attitudes and behaviors by observing or interacting with 
people. As we shall see, people can impart norms relatively passively by example, or through 
more active persuasion. 
Behavioral Averaging, Group Polarization, and Normative Attitudes 
Sherif’s (1935, 1936) autokinetic studies are classic demonstrations of how people 
develop and learn group norms. Participants in small groups called out their estimates of the 
amount of movement of a light source – the source was not actually moving but appeared to 
move due to an illusion called the autokinetic effect. Sherif found that people quickly adjusted 
their judgments into a tight range around the average of the group’s initial judgments. A norm 
had emerged. Furthermore, the norm persisted even when all original members of the group 
had left and the group had entirely new members (Jacobs & Campbell, 1961; MacNeil & 
Sherif, 1976). Social identity research has demonstrated that this norm formation is 
accelerated, and the group norm is more tightly convergent, when participants identify 
strongly with the group (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990).
Sherif’s norm formation studies, along with most other studies of norms, assume that a 
group norm is the average ingroup position. However, from a social identity perspective norms 
do not have to be the average ingroup position. Prototypes, as individual representations of 
group norms, are formed from intra- and intergroup comparisons that obey the metacontrast 
principle; thus, prototypes polarize norms to differentiate between groups. As the intergroup 
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comparative context changes, the ingroup norm also changes to maintain intergroup 
differentiation. 
This idea has been tested using variants of the group polarization paradigm (Isenberg, 
1986; Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969) in which group discussion, or mere exposure to fellow 
group members’ attitudes, produces a final group attitude that is more extreme than the 
average of the initial members’ attitudes in a direction away from the outgroup. A number of 
social identity studies have found that attitudinal polarization is more extreme when members 
identify more strongly with the group (e.g., Abrams et al., 1990; Mackie, 1986; Mackie & 
Cooper, 1984; Turner, Wetherell, & Hogg, 1989) or in times of uncertainty (e.g., Sherman, 
Hogg, Maitner, & Moffitt, 2006). Hogg, Turner, and Davidson (1990), for example, 
demonstrated that group members’ attitudes shifted towards a perceived normative attitude 
that best defined the group in contrast to other groups even in the absence of actual group 
discussion and interaction. 
This research on norm formation and group polarization shows that attitudes are 
responsive to social context. People use others’ attitudes, particularly when they share a social 
identity with those others, to construct a group norm that specifies what attitudes are 
normative. People use this normative information to configure their own attitudes. Group 
members deduce the content of a social identity from shared membership in a social category 
and the wider social context of intergroup relations (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005).
Communication and Normative Attitudes
Although mere exposure to others’ attitudes allows one to construct an attitudinal 
norm, many group contexts involve at least some degree of discussion that often is oriented 
toward making a group decision or arriving at a group position. However, such group 
interactions also are overwhelmingly about establishing, negotiating, or confirming group 
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attitudes, norms, and identity (Hogg & Reid, 2006). Group members infer or induce the 
content of a social identity (norms, attitudes, rules) from intragroup communication and the 
individual contributions of group members (Postmes et al., 2005). Communication serves to 
construct norms and identity – communication provides the means by which abstract 
characteristics of the group can be translated into a concrete situational norm or prototype that 
applies to actions within a specific context. In a study of electronic communication, Postmes, 
Spears, and Lea (2000) demonstrated that over time, groups converged in both the content and 
the stylistic form of their messages, producing attributes that were distinctive to the group and 
decreasing within-group heterogeneity. There also is evidence that over time, majority views 
and norm-consistent attitudes tend to dominate, and that group discussion strains out norm-
inconsistent attitudes, narrowing the group’s scope to focus on norm-consistent attitudes 
(Kashima, 2000). Members who espouse non-normative attitudes often are discredited 
(Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001), and direct criticism of groups is tolerated more if the 
critic is viewed as an ingroup, not an outgroup, member (Hornsey, 2005; Hornsey & Imani, 
2004).
Attitude Change
In this section, we apply the social identity perspective on attitudes to the area of 
attitude change and examine how social identity can, at the cognitive level, change our 
attitudes. We already have seen how self-categorization depersonalizes our attitudes so that 
they conform to the ingroup prototype, and that this represents genuine attitude change not 
superficial behavioral compliance. This is the most fundamental and basic way in which social 
identities and groups affect attitudes (see Abrams et al., 1990; Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, 
Turner, & Onorato, 1995; Hogg et al., 1990; McGarty, Turner, Hogg, David, & Wetherell, 
1992; Turner et al., 1989). 
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Persuasion
Early research on attitude change viewed source or communicator characteristics as a 
key variable in determining the effectiveness of an attitude change attempt. Sources high in 
attractiveness, expertise, and so forth produced more attitude change and were more 
persuasive than other sources (e.g., DeBono & Telesca, 1990; Hovland & Weiss, 1951). 
However, less attention was given to the impact of shared group membership between the 
source and the audience on persuasion.
Research has shown that the social identity, shared or otherwise, of the individuals in 
the source and audience roles can have considerable impact on both the processing and 
eventual effectiveness of persuasive appeals. According to the social identity approach, when 
social identity is salient, the validity of persuasive information is (psychologically) established 
by ingroup norms (Turner, 1991). Thus, because ingroup messages are perceived as more 
subjectively valid than outgroup messages, people should be more influenced by ingroup than 
outgroup sources. 
Research supports this contention: Persuasive messages lead to greater attitude change 
when they are presented by a source who shares the message recipients’ group membership 
than when they are presented by a source who does not share this membership (Abrams et al., 
1990; McGarty, Haslam, Hutchison, & Turner, 1994; Wilder, 1990). However, this effect is not 
due merely to heuristic processes or compliance – ingroup sources can persuade through a 
number of different mechanisms, depending on the circumstances. The mere presence of an 
ingroup source can act as a persuasive cue, leading to increased acceptance, especially when 
the group’s position on the issue is clear (Mackie, Gastardo-Conaco, & Skelly, 1992) or under 
low elaboration conditions such as a novel attitude topic (Fleming & Petty, 2000). However, 
an ingroup message can motivate systematic and effortful processing, especially on group-
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relevant or group-defining issues (Mackie, Worth, & Asuncion, 1990; van Knippenberg & 
Wilke, 1992) or when the message is delivered by a prototypical or representative group 
member (van Knippenberg, Lossie, & Wilke, 1994). Thus, the processes of attitude change are 
influenced by social identities and shared group memberships. The social context of groups 
determines what information is deemed to be persuasive and the processes by which attitudes 
are changed. 
Dissonance
One of the best established accounts of attitude change is offered by cognitive 
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; for a recent review see Cooper, in press; Stone & 
Fernandez, this volume). Specifically, when people realize that their behavior is inconsistent 
with their attitude, they experience dissonance that must be resolved, and because behavior is 
hard to deny, it is usually the attitude that must change. Although one of the first studies of 
dissonance focused on how members of a group turned to one another to help reduce their 
dissonance when a prophecy failed (Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1957), most research on 
attitude change through dissonance is focused on individual cognition (cf. Matz & Wood, 
2005).
From a social identity perspective, we would expect that people who experience 
dissonance may be vigilant about the behavior and reactions of other people. In many contexts 
it would matter a great deal whether that other person shared the same group membership. 
McKimmie and colleagues (2003) found that participants who behaved counter-attitudinally 
experienced less dissonance and attitude change when they knew that another participant had 
also behaved counter-attitudinally, but only when they shared a salient common ingroup 
membership with that person. 
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Group norms may play a complicated role in producing this identity-contingent effect. 
On the one hand, ingroup normative support for one’s underlying attitude may bolster the 
attitude, or it may actually make dissonance even more acute. On the other hand, normative 
support for one’s attitude-inconsistent behavior may protect one from dissonance and attitude 
change. Invoking the notion of meta-consistency, McKimmie, Terry, and Hogg (2006) go 
further to suggest that what may be particularly important is whether or not the other ingroup 
member has engaged in counter-attitudinal behavior like oneself. Dissonance and attitude 
change is reduced if a fellow ingroup member also has behaved counter-attitudinally 
(McKimmie et al., 2003). In a similar vein, Robertson and Reicher (1997) have argued that 
people experience dissonance if their behavior is inconsistent and there is no normative 
support for their inconsistency. However, if there is support (i.e., others in the group also 
behave in ways that are inconsistent with attitudinal norms), dissonance is reduced.
Vicarious Dissonance
Another way that social identity processes may influence dissonance and attitude 
change is through vicarious dissonance. Cooper and Hogg (2002) argue that if you observe 
someone else experiencing dissonance because they have behaved counter-attitudinally, then 
you as an observer will vicariously experience dissonance and change your attitudes – but only 
if you share a salient social identity with the other person. This idea fits well with other 
research showing that shared identity facilitates perspective taking (Batson, Early, & Salvarini, 
1997), increases empathy (Davis, 1994), and enhances vicarious emotions (Hatfield, 
Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994).
Cooper and associates have published five studies using classic dissonance paradigms 
(Monin, Norton, Cooper, & Hogg, 2004; Norton, Monin, Cooper, & Hogg, 2003) that provide 
support for their vicarious dissonance theory. In these studies, participants experienced greater 
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dissonance and attitude change when they observed a fellow member of a salient ingroup 
behave in a way that would cause the actor to experience dissonance. For example, 
participants who heard a member of a group with which they strongly identified agree to 
deliver a counter-attitudinal speech experienced elevated discomfort. However, this discomfort 
was reduced by changing their own attitude in the direction of the position espoused by the 
speaker (Norton et al., 2004). Vicarious dissonance processes, and the processes outlined in 
McKimmie et al’s (2006) meta-consistency effect, show that the experience of dissonance, 
which can affect attitudes, can be fundamentally influenced by group memberships and social 
identities.
Minority Influence
Despite the fact that group norms are generally grounded in wide majority consensus, 
and that groups are motivated to maintain agreement and avoid disagreement, minorities can 
be very effective in modifying or changing the attitudes and behaviors represented by the 
majority norm – indeed active minorities are an important vehicle for social change 
(Moscovici, 1976). Research on minority influence shows that minorities are very effective in 
changing majority attitudes if the minority’s position is novel and the minority adopts a 
consistent yet flexible style of social influence and persuasion (e.g., Martin, Hewstone, & 
Gardikiotis, this volume, Mugny, 1982; Nemeth, 1986; Ziegler, Diehl, Zigon, & Fett, 2004). 
Not all minorities are equally effective in producing attitude change. Perceptions of 
shared group membership between the majority and the minority are a critical determinant of 
the success of minority influence. That is, ingroup minorities, but not outgroup minorities, 
produce change. David and Turner (1996, 1999) conducted a series of experiments to test the 
relative impact of ingroup and outgroup majorities and majorities. In addition to demonstrating 
that the immediate influence of ingroups was positive (i.e., towards the source’s position), and 
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the immediate influence of outgroups was negative (i.e., away from the source’s position), 
these studies highlighted the power of ingroup minorities to produce greater attitude change 
over time. Crano (2001) has proposed a leniency contract model to account for the ability of 
ingroup minorities to produce majority opinion change. Integrating insights from both social 
identity and information processing approaches, Crano argues that ingroup minorities exert 
influence because of the lenient evaluation afforded members of the same social category. 
Provided that the minority does not pose a threat to the majority, shared group membership 
allows for relatively open-minded elaboration, because the majority attempts to understand the 
unexpected position held by this minority of fellow ingroup members, which ultimately 
creates pressures for attitude change.
One consequence of successful minority influence is not just change in the individual 
attitudes of group members. Successful minority influence also changes the structure and 
meaning of minority and majority groups. Prislin and her colleagues have highlighted the 
dynamic nature of minority influence (see Prislin & Christensen, 2005, for a review). For 
example, majorities who find themselves in a new minority position tend to agree with the 
newly emerging attitudinal consensus (Prislin et al., 2000) and to interpret attitudinal 
differences within the group as diversity rather than deviance (Prislin, Brewer, & Wilson, 
2002). In contrast, successful minorities bolster their attitudes by enhancing attitudinal 
importance, restricting what are considered as acceptable attitudes, and expressing less 
tolerance of minority views. It is clear that changes in the attitudinal landscape influence the 
social context of identities just as changes in the social context of identities influence the 
attitudinal landscape. 
The Third-Person Effect
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Social identity processes not only influence persuasion and attitude change processes, 
they also influence the extent to which individuals perceive that they, and those around them, 
are influenced by persuasion attempts. The third-person effect refers to the tendency for people 
to perceive that others are more influenced by persuasive communications than they are 
themselves (Davison, 1983). Moreover, people act on the basis of these distorted perceptions – 
attitudinal and behavioral change may result from the belief that the options of others have 
been altered (e.g., Gunther, 1995). 
From a social identity perspective, third-person perceptions should be highly sensitive 
to the categorization of self and other into relevant ingroups and outgroups. Perceptions of 
influence are dependent on salient social identities – perceived self-other differences in 
persuasibility are affected by the social context and reflect ingroup norms about the 
acceptability of acknowledging influence. Duck and associates (Duck, Hogg, & Terry, 1999, 
2000; Duck, Terry, & Hogg, 1998) have demonstrated that evaluations of influence are 
governed by group memberships and the extent to which being influenced is normative for the 
relevant ingroup or outgroup (see also Reid & Hogg, 2005). When it is normative to resist 
persuasion, such as for negative media content (e.g., pornography, violence), individuals will 
see themselves and members of their ingroup as highly resistant and see members of the 
outgroup as less resistant (a third-person effect). In contrast, when it is normative to 
acknowledge persuasive influence, such as for positive media content (e.g., public health 
announcements), individuals will see themselves and members of their ingroup as quite 
yielding and see other targets as less so (a reverse third-person effect or a first-person effect). 
A social identity account for the third-person effect has been supported in a number of 
areas, including political campaigning (Duck et al., 1998), public service advertising (Duck et 
al., 1999), and the relative influence of different media (Reid & Hogg, 2005). Third-person 
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effects are dynamic and influenced by changing intergroup contexts – these perceptions can 
change suddenly and dramatically over time in response to changes in the current status and 
power structure (Duck et al., 1998) or changes in the target of social comparison (Reid & 
Hogg, 2005). Thus, perceptions of the relative impact of persuasive communications are 
context-dependent and fluid and reflect salient social comparisons and social identities within 
the immediate social context.
Attitudes and Action
One of the key issues in attitude research has been the relationship between attitudes as 
internal representations and overt behavior (what people say and do). Indeed, one of the 
reasons that researchers and practitioners are interested in attitudes is because it is assumed 
that attitudes predict action (see Aizen, this volume). If you cannot predict behavior from 
attitudes, or vice versa, then attempts to change people’s health related, consumer or voting 
behavior via public education, propaganda, and advertising are pointless.
Attitude-Behavior Relations
Early attitude researchers often assumed, in line with common opinion, that attitudes 
translate into overt behavior, despite evidence that attitudes and behavior were largely 
unrelated (Kutner, Wilkins, & Yarrow, 1952; LaPiere, 1934). Although early reviews of the 
field suggested that attitudes typically did not predict behavior well (Wicker, 1969), it is now 
generally accepted that there is a relationship between attitudes and action (Kraus, 1995), and 
recent research has focused on elucidating under what conditions attitudes influence behavior 
(the “when” question – see Zanna & Fazio, 1982). One of the most influential outcomes of this 
line of research was the acknowledgement that it is necessary to take into account other 
variables in addition to attitude to understand fully the nature of the attitude-behavior 
relationship. 
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Of particular relevance to social identity theory is the role of norms in attitude-
behavior correspondence. The theories of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein 
& Ajzen, 1974) and planned behavior (Ajzen, 1989) are notable in their inclusion of a role for 
social norms. These models argue that subjective norms influence attitude-behavior 
consistency. What is meant by this is that if one knows that significant other individuals (e.g., 
friends, family members) approve of engaging in a particular behavior, one’s attitude is more 
likely to translate into behavior. However, although normative support does improve attitude-
behavior correspondence, research shows the effect to be surprisingly small. A number of 
meta-analyses have suggested that the predictive ability of the subjective norm construct is 
limited (Farley, Lehmann, & Ryan, 1981; Hausenblaus, Carron, & Mack, 1997) and that 
subjective norm is the weakest predictor of behavior (Armitage & Conner, 2001). The 
weakness of the link between norms and behavior even led Ajzen (1991) to conclude that 
personal factors are the primary determinants of behavior. 
According to Terry and Hogg (1996, 2001), one reason for this relatively weak effect 
may be the way that norms are conceptualized. In the theories of reasoned action and planned 
behavior norms are separated from attitudes – attitudes are “in here” (private, internalized 
cognitive constructs), whereas norms are “out there” (public, external pressures representing 
the cumulative expectations of others). This conceptualization of norms is different from that 
used by social identity theory (Turner, 1991), and by much of contemporary social psychology 
of groups (Brown, 2000). 
Drawing on the social identity perspective, Terry and Hogg and their associates (Terry 
& Hogg, 1996, 2001; Terry, Hogg, & Duck, 1999; Terry, Hogg, & White, 2000) argue that 
attitudes are more likely to express themselves as behavior if the attitude (and associated 
behaviors) are normative properties of a social group with which people identify. In 
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circumstances where membership of a particular social group becomes a salient basis of self-
definition, attitudes and group norms come to govern our own behavior. Attitudes express 
themselves as behavior if they are group normative and if group membership is salient. Thus, 
it can be predicted that the relationship between attitude and behavior will be strengthened 
when group members perceive that the attitude is normative for the group and weakened when 
group members perceive that their attitude is out of step with the group.
In two tests of the theory of planned behavior, Terry and Hogg (1996) examined 
longitudinally students’ intentions to exercise regularly and to engage in sun-protective 
behavior. They found that the perceived norms of a specific and behaviorally relevant 
reference group were related positively to students’ intention to engage in health behaviors. 
These intentions were significantly stronger among participants who identified strongly with 
the reference group. Other field research has replicated this effect in studies of smoking in 
young people (Schofield, Pattison, Hill, & Borland, 2001), healthy eating behavior (Astrom & 
Rise, 2001; Louis, Davies, Terry, & Smith, in press), recycling behavior (Terry, Hogg, & 
White, 1999), and environmental behavior (Fielding, Terry, Masser, & Hogg, 2006). 
Subsequent experimental and field studies have replicated this finding and have 
explored moderators and boundary conditions. These studies, which have examined a range of 
attitude issues (e.g., campus and political issues, career choice), have demonstrated 
consistently that the attitude-behavior relationship is strengthened when group members are 
exposed to an ingroup norm supportive of their initial attitude, and weakened when exposed to 
a non-supportive ingroup norm, but only when group membership is salient or when 
individuals identify strongly with the group (Smith & Terry, 2003; Terry, Hogg, & McKimmie, 
2000; Wellen, Hogg, & Terry, 1998; White, Hogg, & Terry, 2002). Furthermore, it has been 
shown that group members are sensitive to the relevance of an attitude to the group. Attitudes 
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that are more central or relevant to a group are perceived to be more personally important and 
relevant to group members and, in turn, are more predictive of behavior (Smith, Terry, Crosier, 
& Duck, 2005). 
In addition, Terry, Hogg, and colleagues have demonstrated that social factors, such as 
the salience or importance of social identity and group norms, have more impact on the 
attitude-behavior relationship than more cognitive factors, such as attitude accessibility or 
mode of decision-making (Smith & Terry, 2003; Terry, Hogg, & McKimmie, 2000; Wellen et 
al., 1998). For example, Smith and Terry (2003) considered simultaneously attitude 
accessibility and mode of decision-making as the cognitive factors associated with Fazio’s 
(1990) MODE (Motivation and Opportunity as DEterminants of mode of behavioral decision-
making) model and identification and ingroup norms as the social factors associated with the 
social identity approach. Contrary to the predictions of the MODE model, two studies found 
that attitude accessibility had no effect on behavioral intention or behavior, and that ingroup 
norms influenced behavioral intentions and behavior in both the spontaneous and deliberate 
decision-making modes. Furthermore, group norms had a stronger effect for high identifiers in 
the deliberative, as opposed to the spontaneous, decision-making conditions, suggesting that 
individuals who are strongly identified with a group are motivated to process group-relevant 
information carefully and effortfully (see also Mackie & Queller, 2000).
Research within the social identity approach to attitude-behavior relations has also 
focused on the motivations that may underlie group-mediated attitude-behavior consistency. 
According to uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2000, in press) feelings of self-related 
uncertainty motivate people to identify with self-inclusive groups and to identify more 
strongly with such groups. Research has shown that self-related uncertainty influences the 
attitude-behavior relationship. Smith, Hogg, Martin, and Terry (in press) report two studies in 
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which feelings of self-uncertainty were manipulated and participants were exposed to attitude-
congruent, attitude-incongruent, or ambiguous group norms. In both studies, more self-
uncertain participants expressed greater intentions to behave in line with their attitudes when 
their attitude was normative for the ingroup, whereas more certain participants’ behavioral 
intentions were unrelated to the level of normative support. Thus, conformity to group norms 
is enhanced when individuals feel uncertain, suggesting that the desire to resolve uncertainty 
may underpin group-normative behavior. 
In addition to an epistemic, uncertainty-related motive, group members also conform 
to group norms for strategic, self-presentation reasons. Drawing on recent research and 
theorizing on the strategic expression of social identity (see Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 
1995), Smith and colleagues (Smith, Terry, & Hogg, in press, 2006) have shown that strategic 
concerns, such as those associated with accountability to particular audiences, influence the 
expression of group-normative attitudes and behavior. In two experiments, Smith et al. 
manipulated level of normative support and response context (anonymity vs. accountability). 
In addition, the importance of the social identity to the individual was either measured (Study 
1) or manipulated (Study 2). Across both studies, it was found that low identifiers, or 
individuals in low-salience contexts, were more inclined to follow an ingroup norm when 
accountable to the ingroup than when anonymous to the ingroup, suggesting that these 
individuals may be more subject to self-presentational concerns, such as a desire for positive 
evaluations (see also Barreto & Ellemers, 2000). In contrast, high identifiers, or individuals in 
high-salience contexts, were more likely to follow the ingroup norm in anonymous conditions. 
This latter effect, which is inconsistent with past research and theorizing on the 
communicative aspects of group behavior (e.g., Emler, 1990) was thought to reflect an 
intrinsic motivation on the part of high identifiers and high-salience participants to act and 
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perceive themselves as worthy group members. That is, and in line with self-determination 
theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000), individuals who are intrinsically motivated to engage in 
particular courses of action, such as high identifiers engaging in group-normative behavior, are 
more likely to engage in the action in anonymous conditions because such behavior cannot be 
attributed to external constraints and, therefore, may be more diagnostic of loyalty to the 
group. 
This growing body of research in the attitude-behavior context highlights the 
widespread and pervasive influence of group factors on the attitude-behavior relationship. 
Social identity and group norms influence the attitudes and actions of all group members 
under a range of decision-making conditions and in a range of social contexts.
Collective Action
According to the social identity analysis of attitudes, people are more likely to behave 
in line with their attitudes if the attitudes and behaviors are normative of a salient social group 
with which they identify strongly. The more definitional of the norm the attitudes and behavior 
are, and the more injunctive the norm itself is, the stronger the likelihood. This idea has 
important implications for collective mobilization, the study of how individual attitudes are 
transformed into collective action (Klandermans, 1997; Reicher, 2001; Stürmer & Simon, 
2004; Tyler & Smith, 1998), and how and why people who have sympathetic attitudes towards 
an issue become mobilized as activists or participants. From a social identity perspective, 
collective action that is attitude-consistent is most likely when the attitude and action are 
normative of a group with which people identify and therefore feel motivated to follow. The 
normative attitude co-ordinates group members to advance group interests, translating the 
group-normative attitude in actions that generate benefits to the group and the individual group 
member. Ultimately, it is group identification that increases the probability of social action and 
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collective protest (Stürmer & Simon, 2004). Identification is associated directly with collective 
action, independently of “rational” cost-benefit analyses (Simon et al., 1998; see also Kelly & 
Breinlinger, 1995). Identity, and the norms associated with that identity, influence perceptions 
of the consequences of collective action (Louis, Taylor, & Neil, 2004). Individuals will 
strategically conform to, or violate, ingroup and outgroup norms to acquire benefits for the 
group and avoid costs (Louis, Taylor, & Douglas, 2005). Furthermore, for individuals who 
identify with a particular group, engagement in collective action may be less about the 
effectiveness of the action in influencing public opinion or one’s opponents, and more about 
the effectiveness of the action in building an oppositional or political movement (Hornsey et 
al., 2006). The decision to engage in collective action, and collective mobilization itself, is 
shaped and guided by social identity, normative attitudes, and normative behavior.
Summary and Closing Comments
The study of attitudes, how they are structured, how they are formed, how they change, 
and how they influence behavior, has always lain close to the heart of social psychology. 
Although it is clearly acknowledged that attitudes are formed, sustained and changed through 
social interaction, traditional research on the social psychology of attitudes has focused on the 
intra-individual dimensions of attitudes and on processes of inter-individual influence and 
persuasion that produce attitude change. The wider social context of attitudes as normative 
attributes of social groups and identities located in intergroup contexts has, but for some 
notable exceptions (Crano, in press; 2001; Prislin & Wood, 2005), been conspicuously under-
researched. 
In this chapter we document and explain how the social context can be integrated more 
completely into the study of attitudes by approaching the study of attitudes from the 
perspective of social identity theory. We have described how social identity theory 
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conceptualizes attitudes, viewing them as normative attributes of social groups that define who 
we are and provide us with an identity in society. This social identity function of attitudes 
means that attitude phenomena are closely tied to collective self-conception and to the 
dynamics of group life and intergroup relations. By considering attitudes from a social identity 
perspective, we can see how three common motives for attitude phenomena – the need to 
understand reality, the need to achieve a positive and coherent self-concept, and the need to 
relate to others and convey an appropriate impression to them (Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Prislin 
& Wood, 2005) – can all be satisfied by the processes of self-categorization and social 
identification.
The processes of social categorization and prototype-based depersonalization 
associated with social identity translate group normative attitudes into individually held 
attitudes – cognitive representations in the mind of individuals. Social identity processes also 
influence how we construct and perceive group norms and who or what is most influential in 
providing norm-relevant information. Because normative attitudes delineate and define groups 
relative to other groups, they tend to be polarized in social identity contexts. Furthermore, this 
self-definitional function of attitudinal norms means that group-defining attitudes are more 
likely to be reflected in behavior when people identify strongly with a group – a process that 
can mobilize sympathizers to engage in collective action and social protest.
There is relatively robust empirical evidence for much of the social identity analysis of 
attitudinal phenomena. However, there are avenues for further research in a number of areas – 
for example, the role of dissonance processes in social identity related attitude change (Cooper 
& Hogg, 2002) and the role of uncertainty in social identity mediated normative attitudinal 
structure (Hogg, in press). The study of implicit attitudes, which has become popular in recent 
years (see Devos, this volume; Greenwald et al., 2002), is another avenue for future research – 
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prompting the question of the extent to which social identity processes influence implicit, as 
well as explicit, attitude phenomena. On a more practical note, one challenge is to apply the 
social identity analysis of attitudes more consistently to issues of social concern such as health 
behaviors, environmental behaviors, and prejudice and discrimination. Some advances in this 
domain have been made (e.g., Fielding et al., 2006; Terry & Hogg, 1996; Terry et al., 2001), 
but more research needs to be done to realize fully the social and theoretical impacts of this 
approach. Many exciting and interesting challenges remain in studying attitudes under 
conditions that take into account the complex embedding of attitudes in group and intergroup 
contexts that extend over time.
All in all, however, we hope we have shown how social identity theory provides an 
integrative group-based analysis of attitudes and attitude phenomena - an approach that 
explicitly ties attitudes to the wider social context of social identities, social groups, and the 
dynamics of intergroup relations. This perspective provides a powerful and fresh complement 
to the more traditional social psychological approach to attitudes that focuses on the individual 
and on interindividual interaction.
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